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Terrorism, War and Justice: The Concept
of the Unlawful Enemy Combatant
GEORGE C. HARRIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2002, while in Alexandria, Virginia, preparing for a
motions hearing in the John Walker Lindh case, I noticed in a
press report that Chief Justice Rehnquist had addressed federal
judges in Virginia on the theme that "[i]n time of war, the laws are
silent."' Ironically, one of the pending motions on behalf of Lindh
relied on the international law of war to argue that Lindh could
not be prosecuted for conspiracy to commit murder (one of the
charges pending against him) based merely on having been a
soldier on one side of a military conflict.2
The government argued in response to this motion that Lindh
had been conclusively determined by the President to be an
"unlawful enemy combatant" not entitled to lawful combatant
immunity, and that the government's determination was not
subject to review by the courts. In support of that position, the
" J.D., 1982 Yale Law School; M.A.T. 1977, Brown University; B.A. 1974, Yale
College. Mr. Harris is currently a partner at the firm of Morrison & Foerster, LLP in San
Francisco. His clients include John Walker Lindh. This article is based on his presentation
at International Law Weekend West 2003 conference.
1. David G. Savage, Historically, Laws Bend in Time of War, Rehnquist Says; Courts:
Chief Justice Contends Judges are Inclined to Back the Government in Crises. Lincoln's
Suspension of Habeas Corpus is Cited, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 2002, at A22; William H.
Rehnquist, The Use of Military Tribunals, Remarks of the Chief Justice at the D.C.
Circuit Judicial Conference (June 14, 2002), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
publicinfo/speeches/sp_06-14-02.html. Chief Justice Rehnquist has also written on this
topic. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
WARTIME (2000).
2. United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 552-53 (E.D. Va. 2002).
3. Government's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count One of the
Indictment for Failure to State a Violation of the Charging Statute (Combat Immunity)
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government relied on a two-page fact sheet that Presidential Press
Secretary Ari Fleischer provided at a press conference in February
2002; the fact sheet announced that the President had determined
that all Taliban detainees were unlawful combatants.4
It is the opinion of some, and apparently the prevailing view
in the current Administration, that our ordinary criminal justice
system is not adequately equipped to cope successfully with the
current threat of terrorism.5 As a result, the Administration's anti-
terrorism effort has moved from a criminal justice model to a war
model, with the emphasis on prevention rather than conviction or
punishment. One aspect of this approach has been to assert
executive discretion to detain terrorism suspects without criminal
charges under the President's war power. In the Executive's view,
it has at least three strategic options to deal with suspected
terrorists: (1) to detain the suspected terrorist in military custody
as an "enemy combatant" indefinitely without judicial review (e.g.
in the Hamdi, Padilla and Al-Marri cases), (2) to bring charges and
try non-citizen suspects in military tribunals (as will apparently be
done to some of the Guantanamo detainees),6 or (3) to charge the
suspect in federal court and treat the suspect as an "unlawful
enemy combatant" not entitled to normal protections of
international law (e.g. the Lindh case).
This policy raises important questions, including: What are
the respective roles of the judiciary, executive, and legislature in
determining the lawfulness of the detention of suspected
terrorists? Does the Executive's determination to use military
force and to treat the 9/11 attacks as acts of war remove the
detention of terrorism suspects by the Defense Department from
(#2) 'at 2, United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (No. 02-37-A), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/lindh/uslindh605O2gop2im.pdf.
4. See id. at 2 n.2, (citing Statement by White House Press Secretary Ari Fleisher on
the Geneva Convention, Feb. 7, 2002, available at http://www.usmission.ch/
press2002/0802fleischerdetainees.htm); Fact Sheet, Office of the Press Secretary, the
White House, Status of Detainees at Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002), available at
htnp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/print/20020207-13.html.
5. See Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,833 (Nov. 16,
2001).
6. The D.C. Circuit has held that U.S. courts lack jurisdiction to consider legal
challenges to the detention of foreign nationals captured in hostilities abroad and
incarcerated at the Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d
1134, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2003) cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 534 (2003) (No. 02-5251,2003 Term;
renumbered No. 03-343,2003 Term).
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ordinary oversight by the judiciary, including habeas review?
Should any judicial oversight be circumscribed by significant
deference to the executive's war power? Whatever the wisdom of
the government's current policy regarding terrorism suspects-
whether it is necessary or even effective in combating terrorism is
an important question for another forum-this policy, and the war
model that animates it, both jeopardize principles fundamental to
our criminal justice system, including: (1) the separation of power
between the judiciary and the executive, (2) the presumption of
innocence, and (3) the principle of individual culpability rather
than guilt by association.
This Article explores the Administration's application of the
unlawful enemy combatant doctrine to terrorism suspects and the
resulting implications for our criminal justice system. Part II
describes current executive policy toward terrorism suspects. Part
III looks at historical precedent for the Executive's use of the
unlawful enemy combatant doctrine. Part IV analyzes current
published decisions bearing on the detention of alleged enemy
combatants. Part V describes an American Bar Association
(ABA) task force report and a bill introduced in Congress to
address the enemy combatant issue. Finally, Part VI concludes that
the government's legitimate interest in gathering intelligence from
terrorism suspects can be accommodated without abandoning the
basic principles of our criminal justice system.
II. THE GOVERNMENT'S CURRENT POLICY TOWARDS TERRORISM
SUSPECTS
To what degree is the apprehension and detention of
suspected terrorists a matter of criminal justice and to what degree
is it part of a war effort? Remarks at the sentencing of shoe-
bomber Richard Reid help to frame that issue. Reportedly, Reid
sought to justify his actions as part of a broad war against the
United States. U.S. District Judge William G. Young told Reid
that to consider himself a "righteous soldier" in a global war
between Islam and the West would give him "far too much
stature," because he was neither an enemy combatant nor a soldier
in any war, but a terrorist.7
7. Pam Belluck, Unrepentant Shoe Bomber is Given a Life Sentence for Trying to
Blow Up Jet, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2003, at A13.
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On the other hand, Jose Padilla, who, like Reid, has
apparently never been on an actual battlefield, has been classified
as an "enemy combatant" based on. his alleged association with al
Qaeda and, on that basis, has been held in a military brig without
charges or access to a lawyer for more than a year.8 Yaser Hamdi
came out of a basement of the Qala-I-Janghi fortress in Mazar-e-
Sharif, Afghanistan on December 1, 2001 with John Lindh and
eighty-two other Taliban prisoners. 9 Hamdi was first held by
Northern Alliance warlord General Rashid Dostum in
Afghanistan, ° then at the U.S. detention camp at Guantanamo,
and, after discovery of his U.S. citizenship, at a military brig in
Norfolk, Virginia since April of 2002.11 As in the case of Padilla,
no charges have ever been filed against him, and he has had no
access to lawyers or to his family.
12
8. William Glaberson, Judges Question Detention of American, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18,
2003, at A19.
9. Brian Blomquist, 2nd American Taliban Moved to Prison in U.S., N.Y. POST, Apr.
6, 2002, at 009; see Lindh's Path to Plea Bargain, USA TODAY, Jul. 16, 2002, at 3A; see
also A Nation Challenged; Excerpt From Lawyers' Filing for Lindh: "Threatened Him With
Death," N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2002, at A12.
10. A Nation Challenged; Excerpt from Lawyers' Filing for Lindh: "Threatened Him
With Death, " N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2002, at A12.
11. Neil A. Lewis, Court Affirms Bush's Power to Detain Citizen as Enemy, N.Y.
TIMES, July 10, 2003, at A16.
12. Some believe that John Lindh received favorable treatment in comparison to
Hamdi and have suggested that this is the result of racism, i.e. treating an Arab-American
differently than a white kid from Marin County, California. See Jonathan Turley,
Commentary, Camps for Citizens: Ashcroft's Hellish Vision, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2002,
at B1l; David Rosenzweig & John Johnson, The Region; Fellow Prisoner is Charged with
Assault on Lindh, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 2003, at B8. The better explanation is, however,
evidence and expedience. The evidence against John Lindh consisted almost entirely of
his own alleged statements to government interrogators. On that basis, he was charged
with crimes that could have resulted in three life sentences plus ninety years. Ultimately,
he entered into a plea bargain for twenty years. Indictment, United States v. Lindh, 227 F.
Supp. 2d 565 (E.D. Va. 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/lindh/
uswlindh020502cmp.pdf; Jane Mayer, Lost in the Jihad; Why Did the Government's Case
Against John Walker Lindh Collapse?, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 10, 2003, at 50, 59. It
remains to be seen how long Mr. Hamdi will be held in custody. Moreover, in the Lindh
case, the government took the position in plea negotiations that Lindh could have been
acquitted of criminal charges, but still held as an unlawful enemy combatant in the sole
discretion of the Executive. The government gave up that right only as part of the plea
bargain in which nine of the original ten charges against Lindh were dismissed. See Plea
Agreement, Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/
lindh/uslindh71502pleaag.pdf; Jane Mayer, supra at 50; Katharine Q. Seelye, The
American in the Taliban; Regretful Lindh Gets 20 Years in Taliban Case, N. Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 2002, at Al.
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What distinguishes Padilla and Hamdi from Reid? The likely
answer is as simple as it is pragmatic-lack of evidence. If there
were enough credible evidence to indict and convict Padilla13 or
Hamdi, it is likely they would have been charged long ago. All
indications are that the government's exercise of its assumed
discretion to choose between military detention and criminal
charges is driven by practicality and expediency. Those against
whom the government believes it has sufficient evidence
(including Lindh, the Lackawanna defendants, and the Portland
defendants) have been charged with crimes;1 4 those against whom
there is apparently insufficient evidence, including Padilla and
Hamdi, have been held by the Defense Department without
charges as enemy combatants.
15
The Administration justifies its current policy toward
suspected terrorists on the basis that the current threat of
terrorism requires an emphasis on prevention rather than justice.
In his decision in the Padilla case, Judge Mukasey of the Southern
District of New York recognized this emphasis, quoting Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld at length:
Here is an individual who has intelligence information... our
interest really in this case is not law enforcement, it is not
punishment because he was a terrorist or working with the
terrorists. Our interest at the moment is to try to find out
everything he knows so that hopefully we can stop other
terrorist acts....
13. The allegations against Padilla are apparently based on statements of al Qaeda
leaders in U.S. custody, including Abu Zubaydah, who was captured in Pakistan in May
2002. See James Risen & Philip Shenon, U.S. Says It Halted Qaeda Plot to Use Radioactive
Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2002, at Al ("Mr. Zubaydah did not identify Mr. Padilla by
name, but provided enough information to allow the Central Intelligence Agency to check
with other sources ... to narrow the search to Mr. Padilla, officials said."); see also Philip
Shenon & James Risen, Terrorist, Yields Clues to Plots, Officials Assert, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 2002, at Al.
14. Eric Lictblau, 4 in U.S. Charged in Post-9/11 Plan to Join al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 2002, at Al; Robert F. Worth, Accused Member of Terror Cell Near Buffalo Agrees
to Guilty Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at A9; John Kifner, After 3 Days of Testimony,
Some Gaps are Unfilled, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23,2002, at A15.
15. When it appeared that the judge in the Lackwanna case might grant bail to the
defendants, the government made it known that it might choose to transfer them to the
custody of the Defense Department as enemy combatants. See Stewart M. Powell,
Presidential Action Possible in Terror Case; Bush Could Designate Lackwanna Suspects as
"Enemy Combatants," TIMES UNION ALBANY, Sept. 21, 2002, at A4.
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It seems to me that the problem in the United States is that we
have - we are in a certain mode. Our normal procedure is that
if somebody does something unlawful, illegal against our
government, that the first thing we want to do is apprehend
them, then try them in court and then punish them. In this case,
that is not our first interest.
Our interest is to - we are not interested in trying him at the
moment. We are interested in finding out what he knows....
[G]iven the power of weapons and given the number of
terrorists that exist in the world, our approach has to [be] to try
to protect the American people, and provide information to
friendly countries and allies, and protect deployed forces from
those kind of attacks.
I think the American people understand that, and that
notwithstanding the fact that some people are so locked into the
other mode that they seem not able to understand it, I suspect
that.., the American people will.
16
Secretary Rumsfeld and other administration spokespersons
articulate two main prongs to the prevention rationale. First,
preventing future attacks requires gathering intelligence from the
suspect. Treating the detainee as a criminal suspect, including the
requirements of probable cause for continuing detention and
advice of right to counsel, would interfere with this effort. Second,
the government asserts the general prisoner of war (POW)
rationale-detention prevents the suspect from rejoining the
enemy and replenishing the enemy's ranks.' 7 Implicit in the
prevention rationale is the conclusion that principles fundamental
to our criminal justice system (including due process, the
presumption of innocence, and the right to counsel) are
inconsistent with, and encumber too much, the goal of preventing
future acts of terrorism.
16. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing News Briefing,
Department of Defense (June 12, 2002), 2002 WL 22026773).
17. Id. at 603. ("The government has argued that affording access to counsel would
'jeopardize the two core purposes of detaining enemy combatants-gathering intelligence
about the enemy, and preventing the detainee from aiding in any further attacks against
America."'); Yaser Esam Hamdi v. Donald Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 465 (4th Cir. 2003)
("[D]etention prevents enemy combatants from rejoining the enemy and continuing to
fight against America and its allies.").
[Vol. 26:31
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III. HISTORICAL PRECEDENT
There is little legal precedent bearing on the Executive's
detention of alleged enemy combatants.18 What precedent exists
comes from World War II and is set against a traditional war with
a clearly defined enemy and conflict.
For use of the unlawful combatant doctrine in the present
context, the government relies primarily on the U.S. Supreme
Court's 1942 decision in Ex Parte Quirin.19 In that case, eight
German saboteurs, one of whom claimed to be a U.S. citizen,
allegedly landed on U.S. soil from submarines, with the intention
of blowing up U.S. installations. The saboteurs were tried in a
military tribunal, convicted and executed, all within about ninety
days.20 Those ninety days included a stop at the U.S. Supreme
Court, which upheld the use of a military tribunal against
constitutional challenges. The Court relied heavily on the fact that
the alleged offenses were violations of the law of war, "which the
Constitution does not require to be tried by jury.",21 Emphasizing
the alleged actions of the individuals and not the status of the
group, the Court used the term "unlawful combatants" to describe
those who had engaged in espionage or other war crimes. Since the
defendants allegedly had gone behind enemy lines "contrary to the
law of war, in civilian dress... for the purpose of committing...
hostile acts",22 -acts that, if proven, constituted war crimes-the
Court held the jurisdiction of the military tribunal was proper. The
Padilla Court admitted, "Quirin offers no guidance regarding the
standard to be applied in making the threshold determination that
a habeas corpus petitioner is an unlawful combatant.,
23
To support its current policy, the government also relies on
another World War II case, In re Territo, decided by the Ninth
Circuit in 1946.24 In that case, the defendant, who was not only a
permanent resident of Italy, but also a U.S. citizen by virtue of his
18. See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 607 ("[Ilt would be a mistake to create the
impression that there is a lush and vibrant jurisprudence governing these matters. There
isn't.").
19. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
20. Andy Newman, Terrorists Among Us (1942): Detecting the Enemy Wasn't Easy
Then, Either, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at B1.
21. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29.
22. Id. at 36 (describing the charges against the petitioners).
23. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 607.
24. In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142 (9th Cit. 1946).
2003]
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birth in the United States, was captured while fighting for the
Italian army.2 5 The Ninth Circuit held that the United States could
detain him as a prisoner of war until the end of hostilities.26 There
were no allegations of war crimes and no allegation that the
detainee, Territo, was an unlawful combatant. Territo, like the
defendants in Quirin, was afforded the right to counsel and full
judicial review.
IV. CURRENT CASES
The government's detention of U.S. citizens in the United
States as allegedly "unlawful enemy combatants" has thus far been
addressed in published decisions in two cases, the Hamdi and
Padilla cases. The premise of the government's position in each of
these cases has been that we are at war with terrorist
organizations, and the President, therefore, has unreviewable
discretion under his war power to detain those who are suspected
of harboring, supporting, or associating with those terrorist
organizations.
A. The Hamdi Case
The Fourth Circuit in Hamdi, ruling on a habeas petition filed
on behalf of Hamdi by the federal public defender for the Eastern
District of Virginia, held that no evidentiary hearing or factual
inquiry was necessary because it was undisputed that Hamdi was
captured in an active combat zone in a foreign country.27 The court
held that his detention by the Defense Department is, therefore, in
accord with the President's constitutional war powers in light of
Congress's authorization to use military force against al Qaeda.28
Further, because there was no evidentiary hearing and no charges
25. Id. at 143.
26. Id. at 148.
27. Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 459 ("Because it is undisputed that Hamdi was captured in a
zone of active combat in a foreign theater of conflict, we hold that the submitted
declaration is a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that the Commander in Chief has
constitutionally detained Hamdi pursuant to the war powers entrusted to him by the
United States Constitution. No further factual inquiry is necessary or proper, and we
remand the case with directions to dismiss the petition."); id. at 473 ("[N]o evidentiary
hearing or factual inquiry on our part is necessary or proper, because it is undisputed that
Hamdi was captured in a zone of active combat operations in a foreign country .... ).
28. Id. at 463 (President's war powers include the authority to "detain alien enemies
during the duration of hostilities.").
[Vol. 26:31
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had been brought, Hamdi had no need or right to access counsel.29
The court specifically noted, however, that it was expressing no
opinion about the circumstances presented by the Padilla case,
where a detainee was not captured in a foreign zone of combat but
in the United States.3°
In response to Hamdi's claim that the relevant hostilities have
concluded, the court suggested that the timing of cessation of
hostilities may not be justiciable at all.3 a Although noting that
American troops are still on the ground in Afghanistan, and
finding on that basis that hostilities are not concluded under even
the most circumscribed definition of hostilities, the court found it
unnecessary to resolve that question.32 For the same reason, it
found it unnecessary to address the more difficult issue of whether
detention can continue to be justified based on the amorphous,
ongoing war on terrorism. Presumably, there will be a point at
which hostilities in Afghanistan are concluded and that issue will
come into focus. On January 9, 2004, the Supreme Court granted
Hamdi's petition for review of the Fourth Circuit's decision.33
Putting aside the important issue of how one determines the
contours of the war on terrorism and whether that issue is
justiciable, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Hamdi can be read as
parallel to the Ninth Circuit's World War II decision in In re
Territo, where an American citizen, captured with enemy forces,
can be held until the cessation of hostilities.34 Territo, however,
obtained a lawyer and was presumably not held in isolation and
incommunicado, as Hamdi has been since December of 2001.
29. See id. at 475 ("As an American citizen, Hamdi would be entitled to the due
process protections normally found in the criminal justice system, including the right to
meet with counsel, if he had been charged with a crime. But as we have previously pointed
out, Hamdi has not been charged with any crime.").
30. Id. at 465 ("We have no occasion, for example, to address the designation as an
enemy combatant of an American citizen captured on American soil or the role that
counsel might play in such a proceeding.").
31. See id. at 476 ("Whether the timing of cessation of hostilities is justiciable is far
from clear.").
32. Id. ("The government notes that American troops are still on the ground in
Afghanistan, dismantling the terrorist infrastructure in the very country where Hamdi was
captured and engaging in reconstruction efforts which may prove dangerous in their own
right. Because under the most circumscribed definition of conflict hostilities have not yet
reached their end, this argument is without merit." ).
33. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 981,981-82 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2004) (No. 03-6696).
34. See In re Territo, 156 F.2d at 147-48.
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The policy justification for Hamdi's detention is less clear.
Whatever intelligence value there was in his continuing
interrogation seems very likely to have been exhausted by this
time. Also, the risk of his returning to take part in the hostilities in
Afghanistan is unrealistic. One must seriously question whether
his "enemy combatant" status is anything more than a rationale
for holding him indefinitely, despite insufficient evidence to charge
him with a crime. There is apparently no allegation of involvement
with terrorism or al Qaeda, or that Hamdi did anything other than
take up arms with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.35
B. The Padilla Case
Unlike Hamdi, Jose Padilla was not captured in a war zone.
He was first taken into custody in the United States on a material
witness warrant issued by the Justice Department. He was later
designated as an "enemy combatant" and transferred to the
Defense Department's custody.36 Judge Mukasey of the Southern
District of New York held that Padilla's detention is not per se
unlawful but that Padilla is entitled to counsel in support of his
habeas petition.37
Padilla argued that his detention by the Defense Department
as an enemy combatant violated 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (Non-Detention
Act), which provides: "No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise
detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of
Congress., 38 The district court held, however, that the joint
resolution of Congress authorizing military force against al Qaeda
was sufficient to fulfill the demands of that statute and that the
authority to detain enemy combatants was inherent in the
35. The blurring of the distinction between Taliban, al Qaeda, and other groups and
between terrorism and military action is an issue requiring separate attention. That issue
was very much at the heart of the allegations and potential defenses in the Lindh case. See
generally Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 541.
36. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 569. A June 9,2002 Presidential Order addressed to the
Secretary of Defense, concluded that Padilla is an enemy combatant. Id. at 571. The
Order alleged that Padilla "is 'closely associated with al Qaeda,' engaged in 'hostile and
war-like acts' including 'preparation for acts of international terrorism' directed at this
country, possesses information that would be helpful in preventing al Qaeda attacks, and
represents 'a continuing, present and grave danger to the national security of the United
States."' Id. at 572.
37. Id. at 599. Because the government pursued an interlocutory appeal and obtained
a stay, Padilla was still not allowed access to counseL Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld,
256 F. Supp. 2d 218, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (2001).
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President's exercise of the war power.39 Therefore, to resolve the
issue of whether Padilla is lawfully detained, the district court held
that it would "examine only whether the President had some
evidence to support the finding that Padilla was an enemy
combatant," that is, "some evidence" that he is "associated with al
Qaeda" and should "be detained as an unlawful combatant.
40
Because the district court held that Padilla, unlike Hamdi, is
entitled to assistance of counsel in aid of his habeas petition, many
hailed the decision as a civil liberties victory. Less attention was
paid to the court's decision on the merits.41 Since the district
court's decision in Padilla could have applied to terrorist suspects
arrested anywhere, not only in a combat zone, it had much wider
potential application than the Hamdi decision and posed a greater
threat to ordinary principles of criminal justice. The standard
articulated for indefinite military detention-"some evidence" of
association with al Qaeda -essentially would have meant that the
Executive could indefinitely imprison anyone suspected of
terrorist association. 42 "Some evidence" of association is a far cry
from probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, let
alone proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Padilla was taken into custody over a year ago and, as in
Hamdi, the government has probably exhausted his use as an
intelligence source on potential future attacks. Had reliable
evidence of his criminal conduct been found, he would likely have
been formally charged by now. But, as an "unlawful enemy
combatant," under the district court's decision, Padilla could have
been imprisoned indefinitely or at least for the duration of the war
on terrorism,43 based on nothing more than "some evidence" to
support a suspicion of terrorist association.
39. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 590, 596.
40. Id. at 608-10.
41. As the court defined it, "the central issue presented in [Padilla was] whether the
President has the authority to designate as an unlawful combatant an American citizen,
captured on American soil, and to detain him without trial." Id. at 593.
42. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 608. Cf Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 596 ("[Tlhe Patriot
Act permits the detention of aliens suspected of activity endangering the security of the
United States, for a period limited to seven days." (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226A(a)(5) (2000))).
43. As in Hamdi, the Padilla court found it unnecessary to address whether the court
could limit the duration of detention based on cessation of the relevant conflict. Id. at 590
("The question of when the conflict with al Qaeda may end is one that need not be
addressed. So long as American troops remain on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan
in combat with and pursuit of al Qaeda fighters, there is no basis for contradicting the
President's repeated assertions that the conflict has not ended .... At some point in the
2003]
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In an opinion issued in December 2003, the Second Circuit
reversed the district court decision in Padilla and remanded "with
instructions to issue a writ of habeas corpus directing the Secretary
of Defense to release Padilla from military custody within 30
days." 44 The appellate court held that the President has no
inherent constitutional power to detain as an enemy combatant a
U.S. citizen seized in the United States, away from a combat zone,
and that the Non-Detention Act prohibits such detention without
express congressional authorization.45 The court found no such
authorization in Congress' approval of the use of military force
against al Qaeda.46 The government has asked the Second Circuit
to stay the effect of its decision 47 and has petitioned the Supreme
Court for expedited review.48
V. PROPOSALS
An ABA Task Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants
that convened in March 2002 issued its final report on February 10,
2003. 49 It concluded, among other things, that: (1) detainees should
be allowed access to counsel (not a surprising conclusion by a
group of lawyers) and (2) Congress should enact legislation
establishing clear standards and procedures governing detention.
The ABA report did not say what the standards or procedures
should be, and was uncritical of the district court decision in
Padilla.
While effective procedures for review of military detention of
terrorism suspects are certainly important, the substantive
future, when operations against al Qaeda fighters end, or the operational capacity of al
Qaeda is effectively destroyed, there may be occasion to debate the legality of continuing
to hold prisoners based on their connection to al Qaeda, assuming such prisoners continue
to be held at that time.").
44. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695,724 (2d Cir. 2003).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Affirmation in Support of Respondent's Motion to Stay the Mandate at 1,
Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) (Nos. 03-2235, 03-2438), available at
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/docs/padilla/padrumsll604staymot.pdf.
48. See Petitioner's Motion to Expedite Consideration of Petition for Certiorari and
to Establish Expedited Schedule for Briefing and Argument if Certiorari is Granted,
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (2d Cir. 2003) (No. 03-1027), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/ hdocs/docs/padilla/rumspadll604usmot.pdf.
49. AM. BAR ASSN, TASK FORCE ON TREATMENT OF ENEMY COMBATANTS:
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/
leadership/recommendations03/109.pdf.
The Concept of the Unlawful Enemy Combatant
standard for such review is also crucial from a criminal justice
standpoint. If the standard articulated by the district court in
Padilla were adopted by Congress, allowing indefinite detention of
a suspect based on "some evidence" of terrorist association,
fundamental principles of criminal justice (including due process,
presumption of innocence, and individual culpability) would not
apply whenever allegations of terrorism are made.
At least one bill has been introduced in Congress to address
this issue: the Detention of Enemy Combatants Act, HR 5684,
introduced in October 2002.50 It received little attention, however,
and was not reported out of committee. It would have provided for
broad executive discretion:
The Executive must be allowed broad latitude to establish by
regulation and Executive order the process, standards, and
conditions in which a United States citizen or lawful resident
may be detained as an enemy combatant. Courts must give
broad deference to military judgment concerning the
determination of enemy combatant status, POW status, and
related questions.
51
On the other hand, it would have explicitly rejected the
Administration's assumption of unreviewable war power to detain
designated "enemy combatants."
Nothing in this Act permits the government, even in wartime, to
indefinitely detain American citizens or other persons lawfully
in the United States as enemy combatants without charges and
hold them incommunicado without a hearing and without
access to counsel on the basis of a unilateral determination that
the person may be connected with an organization that intends
harm to the United States.
52
The bill would have authorized the Secretary of Defense to
establish standards, processes, and criteria in determining whether
a suspect is an enemy combatant, with timely access to challenge
the basis for detention by judicial review.53
Like the ABA report, the proposed legislation focused on
procedural safeguards, leaving significant uncertainty surrounding
the substantive standard for detention. The bill would have
50. Detention of Enemy Combatants Act, H.R. 5684, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002).
51. Id. § 2(10).
52. Id. § 2(14).
53. Id. §§ 3(b), 4.
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authorized for detention, as an enemy combatant, a "United States
person or resident [who] ... knowingly cooperated with a member
of al Qaeda in the planning, authorizing, committing, aiding, or
abetting of one or more terrorist acts against the United States.
54
Such conduct would, however, violate existing criminal statutes,
and the bill does not address the standard of proof necessary for
such detention. Does the bill intend that we should accept a lesser
standard of proof for military detention of suspected terrorists
than for criminal prosecution? If probable cause and ultimately
proof beyond a reasonable doubt are not required, what would be
sufficient - "some evidence," as the district court held in Padilla?
Assuming that the applicable standard of proof has been met,
would indefinite detention without charges be allowed?
The bill also refers to detention of "members of al Qaeda. 55
Penalizing mere membership would run afoul of the 1960
Communist party cases, which established that freedom of
association does not allow punishment of mere membership
without intent to further the organization's unlawful purposes.
The Communist party may seem benign in comparison to al Qaeda
now, but that constitutional principle was established when the
Communist party, backed by a Soviet-sponsored international
movement, dedicated itself to the violent overthrow of our
government. One could argue that al Qaeda is solely a criminal
enterprise and that rights of association do not apply. But
assuming that is true, how is membership proven without evidence
of the defendant's intent to participate in illegal activity?
Penalizing "membership" based on any other criteria is a slippery
slope, especially considering that the Department of State's
54. Id. § 3(a).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961) (holding, in the context
of alleged association with communist organizations, that the Smith Act's prohibition on
organizing, being a member of, or affiliating with an organization that advocates the
violent overthrow of the U.S. government should be construed to punish such association
only with "clear proof that a defendant 'specifically intend[s] to accomplish the [aims of
the organization] by resort to violence."') (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290,
299 (1961)), [alteration in original]; Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 17 (1966) (holding
unconstitutional an Arizona statute permitting prosecution for perjury and discharge from
office who took an oath to United States but knowingly and willfully remained a member
of the Communist party: "[l]aws such as this which are not restricted in scope to those
who join with the 'specific intent' to further illegal action impose, in effect, a conclusive
presumption that the member shares the unlawful aims of the organization.").
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"foreign terrorist organizations" list has included organizations
such as the African National Congress.57
VI. CONCLUSION
The daunting threat of international terrorism presents
serious challenges to our criminal justice system. While the need
for an aggressive policy aimed at preventing future terrorist acts
can scarcely be questioned, these policy concerns can be
accommodated without abandoning our criminal justice system's
basic principles.
The need to gather intelligence does not necessitate indefinite
detention without judicial oversight. Certainly, the intelligence
gathering rationale weakens as time passes. Padilla and Hamdi
have both been held for well over a year 58 and it seems likely that
their intelligence value has been exhausted.
The POW rationale, which prevents return of enemy soldiers,
makes little sense in the terrorist context. Once an individual has
been identified and detained as a suspected terrorist, that
individual loses value to the terrorist organization, at least for any
covert activity. Assuming that Padilla has in fact associated with al
Qaeda, it seems unlikely, for example, that he could be
successfully assigned to a "sleeper cell" after having been in U.S.
custody.
Declaring "war" on terrorism should not be a basis for
detaining terrorist suspects without probable cause and criminal
charges. Ideally, Congress should establish parameters for military
detention for intelligence purposes. Absent such legislative action,
the courts will have to balance the government's legitimate interest
in intelligence gathering against the rights of the accused, and to
set proper limits based on established constitutional principles.
57. JAMES X. DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 118
(2d ed., New Press, 2002) (Had anti-terrorism laws been in effect in the 1980s, "it would
have been a crime to give money to the African National Congress during Nelson
Mandela's speaking tours [in the United States], because the State Department routinely
listed the ANC as a 'terrorist group."'); see also Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v.
Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that Secretary's designation
process did not meet minimum requirements of due process). But see People's Mojahedin
Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (approving
redesignation).
58. Padilla, 256 F.3d at 220 (2003) (facts in Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 571,
indicate he was detained on March 15, 2002); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d at 460 (2003)
(indicates capture in Fall of 2001).
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After reasonable opportunity for intelligence gathering, a
suspected terrorist, like other crime suspects, should be held only
on probable cause supporting criminal charges.5 9 Otherwise,
concluding that terrorism suspects can be held indefinitely based
merely on suspicion and "some evidence" is to conclude that the
terrorist threat justifies suspending constitutional principles at the
core of our criminal justice system, including the right to due
process, the presumption of innocence, the separation of powers
between the executive and the judiciary, and the principle of
individual culpability rather than guilt by association. To so
conclude would be to take a serious step in the direction of a
police state and away from a free society.
59. Whether the fruits of "intelligence" interrogations without Miranda warnings (or
observation of other rights of the accused) should be available for use in a subsequent
criminal prosecution presents a separate and important issue. In Lindh, the government
argued for a battlefield exception to Miranda. Government's Opposition to Defendant's
Motion to Suppress Statements for Violation of His Fifth Amendment Rights (Miranda
and Edwards), United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-37-A).
Because a plea agreement was reached before the suppression hearing began, the court
never resolved that issue. Plea Agreement, United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541
(E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 02-37-A), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/
lindh/uslindh71502pleaag.pdf. While the need to gain intelligence information to prevent
future terrorist acts may justify unwarned interrogations, it does not necessarily follow
that the government can use the fruits of those interrogations in a criminal prosecution
without violating the Fifth Amendment. See Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 2000-01
(2003) (Fifth Amendment violation occurs when coerced statements are admitted as
testimony in criminal case).
